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Países latino-americanos e o acordo internacional  
de comércio: a Conferência de Havana (1947-1948)
NoRMa BReDa Dos saNTos*
RESumO: Este artigo se propõe a estudar a participação dos países latino-americanos na 
Conferência de Havana, que negociou e aprovou a Carta da Organização Internacional do 
Comércio (OIC), incluindo o Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT), em 1947-1948. 
O trabalho mostra que o entendimento predominante entre as delegações latino-americanas 
era o de que as negociações de Havana seriam o resultado das assimetrias de poder material 
e político existentes entre os seus países e os países industrializados. Os latino-americanos 
acreditavam que as suas economias frágeis deviam enfrentar as fortes economias dos países 
industrializados através de planejamento econômico e da substituição de importações, já em 
vigor em vários países latino-americanos desde as décadas de 1930 e 1940. O trabalho mostra 
ainda que a construção do regime de comércio internacional pós-Segunda Guerra mundial 
foi de fato caracterizado por fortes desigualdades materiais e políticas, que prejudicaram a 
capacidade de negociação dos países latino-americanos. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Conferência de Havana; GATT; comércio internacional; Acordo da 
Organização Internacional do Comércio; países da América Latina; o multilateralismo; 
liberalismo enraizado.
ABSTRACT: This article proposes to study the participation of Latin American delegations 
during the Havana Conference, which negotiated and approved the Charter of International 
Trade Organization (ITO), including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
in 1947-1948. It shows that the prevalent understanding of Latin American countries was 
that the Havana negotiations would be the outcome of their existing political and material 
power asymmetries in relation to the industrialized countries. They believed that their fragile 
economies should face the strong economies of the industrialized countries by economic 
planning and import substitution, already in place in several Latin American countries since 
the 1930s and the 1940s. The article also shows that the construction of the post-World 
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War II international trade regime was in fact characterized by strong material and political 
inequalities, which undermined Latin American countries abilities to negotiate.
KEyWORDS: Havana Conference; GATT; international trade; ITO Charter; Latin American 
Countries; multilateralism; embedded liberalism.
JEL Classification: F-13.
The Bretton Woods agreements in 1944, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1947, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 were 
developed under a liberal perspective that has dominated the international agenda 
since the end of World War II. The liberal consensus indicates how the support for 
international free trade would be a confirmation not only of American supremacy, 
but also of its legitimate international leadership.
During the Havana Conference on Trade and Employment (Havana Confer-
ence) held in 1947-1948, the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO) 
was approved. The international organization’s agenda covered a large number of 
issues, including full employment, labour criteria, restrictive business practices, in-
tergovernmental commodity agreements, and investments. The ITO never came 
into being, but the text of the GATT, which was supposed to be incorporated into 
the ITO Charter, came into force in January 1948. Thus, only the legal framework 
for postwar international commercial relations remained. 
The American ITO architects assumed that multilateral trade cooperation 
would entail global economic prosperity, thereby ending poverty and preventing 
war. However, for developing countries, and specifically for Latin American govern-
ments, which constituted a numerical majority1 of the Havana Conference and its 
“bulk” (Hudec, 1987, p. 22), neoclassical economic beliefs had been weakening 
significantly since the beginning of the 1930s. moreover, in their view, World War 
II had confirmed the importance of economic planning and the development of a 
national industry. This explains why the structuralist economic orientation found 
fertile land in Latin America in the 1940s and the decades thereafter. 
Studies on the Havana Conference have mostly focused on the bargaining 
process of the united States, the united Kingdom, and other industrialized countries 
(Wilcox, 1949; Diebold, 1952; Gardner, 1956; Irwin, 1995; Aaronson, 1997; Zeiler, 
1998, 1999; miller, 2000, 2003; Deese, 2008; Irwin, mavroidis and Sykes, 2008), 
with very small attention given to the participation of developing countries. Few 
studies have contributed more resolutely to the understanding of the positions of 
non-hegemonic countries (Brown, 1950; Diebold Jr., 1952; Evans, 1968; Curzon, 
1969; Elkin, 1984; Hudec, 1987; Capling, 2000, 2001; Scott, 2009; Kim, 2010; 
1 Of the total 57 delegations in Havana, seventeen were from Latin America – almost one third Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, uruguay and Venezuela. National Archives (NA), 
“united Nations Conference on Trade & Employment”, Department of Public Information, Havana, 
Cuba, E/CONF.2/BuR/39u. RG 43, RICCE, Box 139.
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Farias, 2012, 2014), although Richard Gardner (1956, pp. 378-379), in his seminal 
work on the history of the u.S.-u.K. collaboration for the creation of the Interna-
tional monetary Fund (ImF) and the Havana Charter, considered that one of the 
principal causes for the ITO’s demise was “the failure to devote more attention at 
the very outset to the economic needs of the under-developed countries”. 
The objective of this article is to study the participation of Latin American 
delegations during the Havana Conference. The article argues that the prevalent 
understanding of Latin American countries was that the Havana negotiations 
would be nothing but the outcome of their existing political and material power 
asymmetries in relation to the industrialized countries. It also argues that the ne-
gotiations for the construction of the new international trade regime were them-
selves characterized by strong and marked inequalities.
This study is made up of three parts. The first one synthesizes the contending 
bilateral negotiations between the u.S. and u.K. officials that resulted in the “Pro-
posals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment”. These Proposals, which 
called for an international conference to negotiate the reduction of governmental 
barriers to trade and to establish the ITO, containing already the principles and 
rules to be multilaterilized in Havana, were published in December 1945. This was 
the moment when the two main rule makers established the boundaries of embed-
ded liberalism, a term widely used by mainstream International Relations literature 
to characterize the postwar economic order, involving a quest for a combination of 
domestic stability and liberalization abroad (Ruggie, 1982, 1992, 2003). The sec-
ond part shows that the Latin American countries’ arrival in Havana was character-
ized by their frustration, since it became clear that the u.S. economic aid they ex-
pected for their support during World War II would not be given. Latin American 
countries had a rather critical perception of the trade regime that was being cre-
ated – a regime that would not address their need for diversifying their economies, 
instead favouring industrial countries. The third part examines the way Latin 
American and u.S. negotiators interacted in Havana and how they perceived each 
other, also showing the Latin American countries’ material and political constraints 
which undermined their ability to negotiate.
Policy formulation and decision-making processes in the different countries men-
tioned along the text will not be examined, which does not mean that States are 
viewed as monolithic entities. Countries’ governments are structured in bureaucratic 
agencies, as departments and ministries, with different institutional roles, reflecting 
different interests; Congress, or Parliament, plays different roles and has different 
relative power in different countries. Leaders’ personalities and public opinion are 
also important factors in policy formulation and decision-making processes.2
This paper is based on the official Havana Conference and u.S. diplomatic 
documentation found at the National Archives (NA, College Park, mD). It is also 
2 See in Irwin, mavroidis, Sykes (2008, pp. 22-27) a good description of the u.S. and the uK policy 
formulation and decision-making process.
312
based on the Brazilian diplomatic papers available at the Brazilian ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ Historical Archives (Itamaraty, Rio de Janeiro). In the post-war 
context, Brazil was undergoing experiences that were common to other countries 
of the continent, where the desire for economic diversification and modernization 
was the foundation for the development of what was later called dependency the-
ory. At the same time, Brazilian diplomacy’s perception was that the u.S. delegation 
should give Brazil a highlighted role in negotiations. Latin American positions are 
also studied through the related specialized bibliography.
AmERICANS AND BRITONS, AND THE EmBEDDED LIBERALISm
In the early 1990s, John G. Ruggie (1992), one of the most influential Interna-
tional Relations theorists3, called attention to the fact that, contrary to what realists 
and neo-realists would predict, the collapse of the Soviet union and the end of Cold 
War had happened peacefully, and that it was quite consensual that multilateral 
norms and institutions had played a relevant role in accommodating the fundamen-
tal geopolitical changes and in stabilizing the post-Cold War world system.4 
Based on William Diebold’s formulation, Ruggie attributes a qualitative or 
substantive dimension to the conventional, nominal, or formal definition of a mul-
tilateral institution, which focuses on the participating number of states – three or 
more states that coordinate their national policies. He insists on the relevance of 
the “kind” of relations existing among the states of a multilateral arrangement or 
the organizing principles instituted among them.
According to Ruggie, what distinguishes post-World War II international rela-
tions is the creation of several multilateral institutions – the united Nations and 
the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the ImF) –, organized under 
u.S. leadership and the compromise of embedded liberalism. According to Ruggie,
to say anything sensible about the content of international economic or-
ders and about the regimes that serve them, it is necessary to look at how 
power and legitimate social purpose become fused to project political au-
thority into international system. Applied to the post-World War II context, 
3 See Griffiths, Roach, Solomon (2008): Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations.
4 The discussion on multilateralism is linked to what in International Relations is called the “regime 
theory”, which aims at explaining international co-operation. Although it is difficult to label Ruggie in 
the development of the International Relations Theory, it can be noted that his work is opposed to the 
rationalistic propositions and is one of the most important thinkers of social contructivism. According 
to Ruggie (2003, xi), “constructivists hold not only that the interests and the preferences of actors are 
socially constructed but that they must share the stage with a whole host of other ideational factor [, 
and, citing max Weber], “‘to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance’” [1949, 
emphasis in Weber original].
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this argument leads me to characterize the international economic order by 
the term “embedded liberalism” […]. (Ruggie,1982, pp. 382-383).
Karl Polanyi (The Great Transformation, 1944) characterized the tragic interwar 
years by the unsuccessful international efforts to restore the golden-exchange stan-
dard, when markets and a laissez-faire attitude had been taken to an extreme and 
become “dis-embedded” from society, or that it lacked a social basis.5 Ruggie adapt-
ed Polanyi’s concept to explain that the “liberalism that was restored after the World 
War II differed in kind from that which had known previously” (1982, p. 392). 
This was the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise: un-
like the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in 
character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its 
multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic intervention (1982, 
p. 393).
With the GATT regime, tariff reductions would be bilaterally negotiated and 
then extended to all other parties of the agreement under the basis of most-favored-
nation (mFN) treatment. According to Ruggie, this has to do with two corollaries 
that follow his definition of multilateralism: the indivisibility of the behavior ex-
pected of the members of the multilateral arrangement, and what Robert Keohane 
has called “diffuse reciprocity”, which is some equivalence of the benefits the States 
of a multilateral institution expect to receive over time (Keohane, 1986).
Nevertheless, if the post-World War II international trade regime can be un-
derstood under the notion of embedded liberalism, this does not explain how the 
search for freer world trade was balanced with protection and other policies, as 
Charles Lipson points out, stating that that two key points remain: 
One is to define the forms of illiberal protection. The second is to 
differentiate embedded liberalism from illiberalism in practice. unless 
one is examining a long-term trend, it may be impossible to tell whether 
specific trade barriers are (1) illiberal steps toward broader protection, or 
(2) simply efforts to moderate the impact of the world market on domes-
tic society (Lipson, 1983, p. 241).
5 For Polanyi, pre-modern economies reflected the basic principles and values of society – “a function 
of the social” –, while modern market economy and modern nation-state, inextricably linked, implied 
the invention of what he called “market society”, disembedded from social order and where market is 
central to society’s functions. Polanyi’s “thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark 
utopia” (2001 [1944], p. 3). Despite Polanyi wrong assertions and predictions, such as the end of 
capitalism internationalism, his ideas still nowadays resonate in debates on public policy. Besides, as 
Ruggie (1982, p. 388) asserts, Polanyi was correct, as Harry Dexter White and John maynard Keynes, 
in the “premisse that, somehow, the post-war international economic order would have to reflect [the] 
changes in state-society relations if the calamities of the interwar period were not to recur.” 
Revista de Economia Política  36 (2), 2016 • pp. 309-329
314
It would be important, therefore, to focus on the distributional aspects of the 
provisions of the Havana Charter that would create the ITO and the GATT 
frameworks. Indeed, Ruggie takes into consideration Lipson’s critics and empha-
sizes that his focus is on the industrialized world when developing the concept of 
embedded liberalism, while stating that “[t]he compromise of embedded liberal-
ism has never fully extended to the developing countries. […] moreover, the lib-
eralization produced by the GATT has benefited relatively few among them” 
(1982, pp. 413-414). In other words, it would be important to focus on the dis-
tributional aspects of the gains from the provisions of the GATT, as well as on 
their disruptive domestic adjustment costs, not to mention the commitments re-
lated to the liberalization of agriculture – which never comes true – or the devia-
tion from the trade regime rules with the “voluntary” textile export restraints that 
prevailed until recently.
It should be added that before the multilateral ITO Conference of 1947-1948 
and its three multilateral preparatory meetings (London, New york and Geneva), 
bilateral negotiations took place between the u.S. and u.K. officials which resulted 
in the “Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment”, published in 
December 1945. Produced by Americans and Britons, the Proposals were then the 
fundamental document upon which the following multilateral negotiations were 
based. Its content reflects the rules obtained after struggles between the two main 
rule makers of the new international trade system and, consequently, the main 
boundaries of the embedded liberalism.
Therefore, the delimitation of the embedded liberalism – the borders estab-
lished between liberalization abroad and domestic state activism – was first negoti-
ated between the u.S. and the u.K. in 1945. The result of these talks would be the 
starting point for the multilateral preparatory meetings for Havana and the Havana 
Conference itself. It should then be stressed how the u.K. protectionist policies were 
accepted or limited by the Americans in 1945, before looking at the 1946 to 1947 
negotiations and their results.
The American ITO architects believed the world could not prosper only via 
the reduction of obstacles to international trade. Nevertheless, the u.S. govern-
ment was anxious for the prospects of American exports benefiting from liberal-
izing international trade (Feiss, 1948, p. 40). During the years of intense prepara-
tion for war, the proportional place of the u.S. in world trade had been declining: 
in 1945, it corresponded to 6.6 percent of the American gross domestic product 
(Table 1).
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Table 1 – United States Total Trade as a Percentage of Gross National Product*
Year Total Trade GNP % of GNP
1940 $ 72 $ 773 9.3
1945 $ 89 $ 1,355 6.6
1950 $ 114 $ 1,204 9.5
1955 $ 154 $ 1,495 10.3
1960 $ 48.1 $ 513.0 9,3
1970 $ 112.8 $1.010,7 11.1
1980 $ 573.1 $2,708.0 21.2
1990 $1,086.0 $5.546,1 21.4
* In billions of 1993 dollars. 
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President: Transmitted to the Congress, 
February 1994 (Washington D.C. GPO 1994, pp. 268-269, apud Aaronson 1996, p. 8).
When World War II ended, the u.S. was by far the world’s biggest economy 
and military power. The u.K.’s economic and military position had suffered a dras-
tic deterioration and was much weaker, needing the American assistance. Nonethe-
less, the u.K. succeeded in obtaining vital concessions from the u.S. in negotiating 
the new trade regime. The reasons for the u.K.’s success in obtaining concessions 
on key issues such as imperial preferences, quantitative restrictions, cartels and state 
trading have been one of the important matters studied directly or indirectly in 
papers examining the creation of the ITO and the GATT.
For Gardner, the reason for the u.K.’s success in obtaining what they wanted 
on trade issues comes from the u.S. domestic front and strategic considerations. 
For him, by 1947, the u.S. was
in a difficult position. [...] The co-operation of Congress would be nee-
ded to facilitate modifications in the Anglo-American Financial Agree-
ment [American financial assistance to the u.K.]. It would be needed also 
to pass the program of marshall Aid [...] (1956, pp. 357-358).
Thomas Zeiler also calls attention to the pressure at home, but major empha-
sis is given to the u.S. officials’ need to strategically compromise with u.K. pressure 
when the Cold War began. Then,
[u]nfortunately for free-traders the constant pressure for protectionism 
and the ideological background of the Cold War shifted America’s tra-
de objectives from peace to security. Realism and national security, not 
idealism and economic theory, took precedence in decisions (1999, p. 3).
James miller argues that the major trade exceptions were obtained by the u.K. 
from the world’s most powerful nation in their bilateral talks of the final months of 
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1945, which resulted in the “Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employ-
ment”, calling for an international conference to negotiate the reduction of govern-
mental barriers to trade and to establish the ITO, published in December 1945.
The u.S. and u.K. formal negotiations began in October 1945, based on a draft 
prepared by the State Department containing provisions discussed in informal war-
time bilateral talks. Despite the fact that the u.K. was crippled in the war, that 
President Truman had terminated Lend Lease (August), and that the u.K. desper-
ately required American financial assistance, big concessions were obtained from 
the u.S. in the Washington negotiations. The final version of the Proposals deeply 
amended its draft, and the u.S.-u.K. loan negotiations of $ 3.75 billion were suc-
cessfully finalized at the same time (Douglas, mavroidis and Sykes, 2008, p. 71).
For miller, the u.K. overcame elements of the u.S. hegemony and hard diplo-
macy – military, political and economic prestige – with negotiating skills and stra-
tegic thinking.
[T]hey effectively applied ‘soft’ diplomacy in the actual negotiations. [... 
They] resisted American demands with a combination of lucid arguments 
(presented to a receptive audience), pragmatism (versus American idea-
lism), bluff (in the face of American openness), plain stubbornness (aided 
by American flexibility) […]. 
Once obtained, concessions would not be reversed. The u.K. insisted to 
transform an ostensibly bilateral negotiation into a multilateral forum 
where Britain and its allies outnumbered the u.S. by a factor of five to 
one. […]
americans unwittingly elevated their desire for international collabora-
tion to the same level as their advocacy of free trade principles. The State 
Department simultaneously advocated a multilateral process and liberal 
trading principles. yet they failed to recognize the tension at the core of 
this dual program, and thus they never considered the trade-offs invol-
ved in securing both aims. The British, however, were conscious of this 
conflict [and knew that in a multilateral arena its] power would be aug-
mented by its ability to form coalitions that challenged u.S. ideals (2000, 
p. 3; emphasis added).
The abolition of the imperial preferences was supposed to be central and the 
first u.K. commitment so as to obtain the u.S. loan. Still, “[t]he British representa-
tives resisted this effort, citing the close ties of kinship that bound Britain to the 
people of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand” (Irwin, mavroidis and Sykes, 2008, 
p. 39) [principally, South Africa should be added] and, instead, the imperial prefer-
ences6 were maintained with the language that “no preferences would be created 
6 The imperial preference system, established by the Ottawa Agreement of 1932, was supposed to be a 
temporary response to the Hawley-Smoot Tariff act of 1930, which pushed the commercial policies of 
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nor existing preferences increased”; no deadline was set for their abolition.7 The 
u.K. officials also obtained fewer restrictions on the use of import quotas for bal-
ance-of-payments. Cartels were not banned outright and would be examined on a 
case-by-case basis by the ITO, and vague language allowed for maintaining state 
trading practices, subsidies and export taxes. Once obtained, the concessions would 
not be reversed. As important as the indulgence on trade liberalization and other 
trade-related concessions obtained by u.K. officials, the compromise with the u.S. 
to transform the bilateral negotiations into a multilateral forum was crucial, since 
the u.K. would enhance its bargaining power as the leader of a coalition formed 
with its dominions.
“LATINOS”8: LOOKING FOR mODERNIZATION AND STABILITy
The three multilateral meetings preparing for the creation of the global trade 
regime convened in London (First Preparatory meeting), in October and November 
1946, in New york (Second Preparatory meeting), in January and February 1947, 
and in Geneva (Third Preparatory meeting), from April to October 1947. The 
Havana Conference took place from November 1947 to march 1948. Concur-
rently with issues such as labour criteria, restrictive business practices, intergovern-
mental commodity agreements and investments, the GATT – about trade barrier 
reductions – was being negotiated. The GATT was completed and signed at the end 
of 1947 as an interim agreement, and it came into force in January 1948.
In Havana, among the fifty-seven delegations eligible to sign the Final Act of 
the Conference, forty-one were from developing countries.9 When describing the 
opening of the Conference, the Americans mention “a widespread rejection of the 
Charter, principally by Latin-American countries and other undeveloped countries.”10 
many countries to look for protecting their economy from the Great Depression effects. Actually, the 
result was much worse and the international trade collapsed with these “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies. 
“The united States bore some responsibility for this turn of events. What started out in 1929 as a 
legislative attempt to protect farmers from falling agricultural prices led to the enactment of higher 
import duties across the board in 1930. The Hawley-Smoot tariff of that year pushed already high 
protective tariffs much higher and triggered a similar response by other countries. […] The Hawley-
Smoot tariff in the united States was the signal for an outburst of tariff-making activity in other 
countries”. See Irwin, mavroidis, Sykes, 2008, p. 6).
7 Ruggie (1982, p, 397) reminds that “[i]n the spring of 1947, the u.S. delegation arrived in Geneva 
armed with congressional authorization for an overall tariff reduction to 50% of their 1945 levels […], 
in return for elimination of preferences. But, at the same time, the united States entered into preferential 
trade agreements with Cuba and the Philippines”.
8 The word “Latinos” was frequently used by the u.S. delegates in the consulted documents.
9 NA, “united Nations Conference on Trade & Employment”, Department of Public Information, 
Havana, Cuba, E/CONF.2/BuR/39u. RG 43, RICCE, Box 139. 
10 NA, Norweb to the Secretary of State, 29 November 1947, RG 43, RICCE, Box 135.
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When the Havana Conference took place, several Latin American countries – 
and among them Argentina, Brazil and mexico, politically and economically the 
most powerful countries in the region – had already begun the transition from 
outward-looking economic growth to inward-looking development based on im-
port substitution, with different levels of consistency and success. In the 1930s, in 
the case of Brazil, or in the 1940s, most Latin American countries became con-
vinced of the importance of economic planning and the development of a national 
industry. Diversifying their economies was a corollary of the perception of liberal 
trade relations as governed by a division of labour where industrialized countries 
were favoured. Argentina was “an exception which proves the rule, since eco-
nomic diversification had already in this case reduced the weight of primary sector” 
(Thorp, 1994, p. 119). 
Latin Americans countries were highly economically dependent on the u.S., and 
the opposite was not true. In 1946, the value of American exports (uS$ 13,944 mil-
lion) was ten times higher than the exports of countries such as Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile – uS$ 1,753; uS$ 1,652 and uS$ 424 million, respectively. For Argentina, 
Brazil and mexico, international trade represented uS$ 110, uS$ 35 and uS$ 40 
per capita, respectively, but for the u.S. it corresponded to a non-negligible amount 
of uS$ 97 per capita. Nevertheless, exports corresponded to a low percentage of the 
American gross production (8%), while Argentina, Brazil and Chile were substan-
tially dependent on their exports (37%, 42% and 58% of their GDP, respectively). 
Combined with the fact that the u.S. was the main importer of Latin American 
products, these conditions made them deeply dependent on American markets and 
their goodwill, which remained commercially and financially attached to the u.K.









Argentina 1,753 4,706 37 110
Australia 1,265 3,960 32 169
Bolivia 125 ---- ---- 33
Brazil 1,652 3,940 42 35
Chile 424 725 58 78
Mexico 1,202 1,510 61 40
El Salvador 46 — — 23
United  
Kingdom*
9,118 + 32,500 + 28 186
United States 13,944 178,200 8 97
Uruguay 301 — — 131
Venezuela 705 — — 164
*Metropolis, Burma, Ceylon, South Rhodesia, other Territories. 
Source: E/CONF.2/4. Conference of Trade and Employment, Unrestricted, Note by the Executive Secretary,  
29 October 1947.
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The experience of World War II and the shortage of imported manufactured 
products confirmed the understanding of Latin American countries about their vul-
nerability as commodity-exporting countries, encouraging new efforts at import 
substitution. World War II also promoted the u.S. interest in safeguarding and push-
ing for Latin American countries’ supplies of strategic materials – e.g., rubber, man-
ganese, nickel and bauxite – as these countries became the major suppliers of the u.S.
From the beginning of the war, the u.S. strategy for Latin America had a sig-
nificant economic dimension. It was understood the risks that the region’s economic 
difficulties would bring in terms of maintaining solidarity to the Allied forces. This 
solidarity and material support was expected to be rewarded with u.S. economic aid 
after the war, compensating at some point the asymmetries between the u.S. and the 
Latin Americans countries. “The years 1945-48 were characterized by a continental 
hope on the Latin American side that substantial u.S. aid would be forthcoming, and 
continued foot-dragging on the u.S. side” [...] (Thorp, 1994, pp. 130-131).
After the attack on Pearl Harbour, at the end of 1941, the u.S. government 
demanded that Latin American countries announce a commitment to the Allied 
cause. In January 1942, at the Conference of American Foreign ministers in Rio 
de Janeiro, it was decided that the countries of the continent should sever diplo-
matic and commercial relations with the Axis powers. Central American countries 
declared war immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack. mexico would do it in 
may 1942. Brazil and Cuba would participate militarily in the war. 
In the 1940s, u.S. investment rose in the continent, even if it was low when 
compared to the investments received by countries of much greater interest to the 
u.S. Economic cooperation was always a relevant issue in inter-American meetings 
in this period. In 1940, the Conference of American Foreign ministers in Panama 
created the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Commission, which 
in turn created the Inter-American Development Commission “to stimulate the 
increase of non-competitive imports to the u.S., intra-Latin American trade and 
the development of Latin American industry”. In 1941, the Conference of American 
Foreign ministers in Havana asked to develop commodity arrangements. 
In February-march 1945, when the war was almost over with the victory of 
the Allied forces, the American government was already sending a different signal. 
At the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, in mexico, the 
countries of the continent were requested reduce tariffs and welcome foreign cap-
ital. Not surprisingly, “[t]he Latin American participants asked whether the first 
steps should not come from the u.S. or the united Kingdom […]” (Thorp 1994, pp. 
121-122, 131-132).
Therefore, the war gave some ephemeral weight to the u.S.’s continental neigh-
bours. At the same time, it inaugurated a new phase in the u.S.’s relationship with 
the continent, as Latin American dependence turned out to be much bigger eco-
nomically and politically. When the marshall Plan was announced, in July 1947, it 
had become more clear that no recovery program would be offered by the u.S. 
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government11, among other reasons because the region was one of the least tense 
of the international system and not a major focus for the American government. 
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) would be 
signed in September 1947, but no significant military, technical or financial assis-
tance was offered to Latin American countries either.12 
The frustration for not receiving what they considered to be a recognition of 
their cooperation and loyalty during the war reinforced Latin American countries’ 
perception about the existence of a u.S. double-standard treatment: 
[t]he u.S. itself, in granting marshall Aid, was encouraging closer eco-
nomic links between the European countries. Was there not a contradic-
tion between this regional approach, now endorsed fully by the u.K. and 
the universal system of non-discrimination that remained the aim of the 
ITO? (Gardner, 1956, p. 370).
When the ITO Conference began, in November 1947, u.S. economic aid was 
a remote possibility, and the Latin American government’s frustration accompanied 
their delegations to Havana, a frustration which had already risen due to the ex-
tensive trade concessions given to the Britons regarding the Imperial Preferences 
and other trade issues in their bilateral trade negotiations.13
Substantive position cleavages among the negotiators who were involved in 
the creation of the new international trade regime were multiplied when the mul-
tilateral meetings began, amplifying, therefore, the ones that had involved the u.S. 
and the u.K. in their previous bilateral talks. The u.S. and the u.K. had opposed 
positions on the agriculture sector: the u.S. wanted to phase out their domestic 
export subsidies to agriculture, while the Britons intended to keep export subsidies. 
When finally the “Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment” were 
published, in December 1945, agriculture had been excluded from the general rules 
of trade liberalization: quantitative import restrictions and export subsidies were 
11 Latin American non-satisfaction and concerns were largely portrayed in u.S. and Cuban newspapers 
during the Havana Conference. Due to severe balance of payments problems, it was considered that 
without an equal financial support there was the possibility of developing countries receding to the role 
of mere importers of manufactured products and exporters of primary products that they had been 
playing during the war, causing a drastic decrease on capital goods production. AHI, Carlos Alves de 
Souza (Brazilian ambassador in Havana) to Raúl Fernandes (minister of External Relations), 8 march 
1948 Reserved Telegram, n. 65. Conference on Trade and Employment, Brazilian delegation, Ofícios 
(Received), march 1947 to march 1948.
12 “In 1950 Latin America was the only area of the world without a uS aid program, apart from 
meagrely funded Point Four technical assistance program established in 1949. Against the uS$49 billion 
in uS foreign aid to Western Europe in the period 1945-50, only uS$400 million (less than 2 percent 
of total uS aid) went to Latin America. Belgium and Luxembourg alone received more than the whole 
Latin America” (Bethell and Roxborough, 1992: 22).
13 In the end, the Havana Charter provisions and the GATT agreed on the permission of preferential 
agreements.
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permitted. Raising revenue to subsidize their agriculture would not be feasible for 
Latin American countries (Douglas, mavroidis, Sykes, 2008, pp. 70, 76-77).14
Economic development and diversification was indeed a key issue for Latin 
American countries, and import substitution played a part in their attitudes in 
Havana. Nevertheless, a commitment to import substitution was far from being 
their only concern. Developing countries as a whole had faced significant external 
shocks along the three decades that preceded the Havana Conference. The volatil-
ity in commodity markets and the related difficulties were a major concern of de-
veloping countries (Scott, 2009, p. 2). As a Brazilian negotiator would comment 
several decades later: 
the creation of a trade organization should have as one of its main res-
ponsibilities the issue of price stabilization for primary products, for this 
instability was at the root of the balance-sheet difficulties of primary pro-
ducers. This basically involved, however, the problem of agriculture, a sec-
tor which has always witnessed tenacious protectionism, which nowadays 
[1994] threatens the very survival of the GATT (Campos, 2001, p. 109).
organização de comércio deveria ter como uma de suas responsabilida-
des principais o problema da estabilização dos preços de produtos pri-
mários, pois essa instabilidade estava na raiz das dificuldades de balan-
ço dos produtores primários. Isso envolvia, entretanto, basicamente o 
problema da agricultura, setor que sempre provocou um protecionismo 
tenaz, que nos dias de hoje [1994] ameaça a própria sobrevivência do 
GATT (Campos, 2001, p. 109).
Official documents of the Havana Conference, American diplomatic papers 
and the contemporary press show that Latin American delegations not only identi-
fied themselves as a group, but were also perceived as an active group with relevant 
common interests. Despite differences in behaviour, it was not rare that a Latin 
American delegate would speak on behalf of the others in committee meetings and 
informal discussions. Among these countries, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, uruguay, mexico 
and Argentina were perceived as the most active and prominent.15
Concerning Brazil, Chile and Cuba, this could be explained, among other 
things, by the fact that they were the only Latin American countries that took part 
in the New york, London and Geneva Preparatory meetings, being more politi-
14 In 1951, the u.S. Congress confirmed and enlarged agricultural support legislation that would allow 
applying quotas for import control. The exception for export subsidies was an omen of the approval of 
the American waiver in the GATT for pursuing domestic price support programs, in 1955. The American 
waiver would have even more far-reaching consequences, and that was ultimately not removed. Besides, 
it would become the legal basis for the European claims that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
did not defy GATT rules (Goldstein, 1993; Kim, 2010).
15 India, China, Australia and Lebanon were others very active developing countries in the Conference 
(Capling, 2001, 15).
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cally and technically able to work on the issues in discussion in Havana.16 Thus, 
Americans expected these countries to be more committed to the ITO Charter since 
they had been “intimately associated with and through their participation in the 
Preparatory Committee meetings”. Brazil and Cuba were considered the most con-
ciliatory and moderate, while Argentina had the widest visibility due to the ex-
tremely aggressive speeches of its representatives.17
And when the Conference was concluded, although some rules better suited to 
their own preoccupations were introduced, their perception was that the ITO Char-
ter did not correspond to their economic needs (Gardner, 1956, p. 379).
If a general rejection of the international trade Charter had already been no-
ticed at the Havana meeting opening, at its end the u.S. perception was that “Lat-
in American delegations […] [created] many difficulties and, on many points, ex-
pressed […] sharp disagreement with basic u.S. positions”.18 Furthermore,
To varying degrees all Latin American delegations accused the u.S. 
of a lack of sympathy with legitimate Latin aspirations, whether or not 
they were convinced that the u.S. lacks sympathy. […] The Latin Ameri-
can submitted a number of specific arguments to prove the foregoing u.S. 
actions: 1. “The ITO Charter is devoted to protection of the u.S. and 
the industrialized countries.” […] 2. “The united States has aligned it-
self with Europe against Latin America.” […] The united States has been 
unwilling to consider dispassionately and sympathetically Latin Ameri-
can amendments.19
Ten years after the enactment of the GATT, it had become clear that the devel-
oping countries’ perception that they were not profiting from the new order de-
served serious attention. In this context, a group of experts20 was chosen to study 
the specific situation of the developing world. This group produced the Harbeler 
Report, of 1958, which pointed out the challenges the trade system faced and made 
suggestions to address them. The Report stated that 
16 The participants of the Geneva Preparatory meeting are the 23 founding Contracting Parties of the 
GATT, among which only three are Latin American: Australia (then a developing country), Belgium, 
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, 
united Kingdom and the united States.
17 NA, “Analysis of Latin America Proposals, Tactics and Employment (Havana, 21 November 1947 to 
24 march 1948),” J. Robert Schnetzel (Technical Secretary, uS Delegation) Secret, 30 march 1948. RG 
43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions (RICCE), Box 148.
18 NA, “Analysis of Latin American Positions at ITO Conference in Habana with Particular Reference 
to Bogota,” J. Robert Schnetzel, 24 march 1948. RG 43, RICCE, Box 145.
19 NA, “Analysis of Latin America Proposals, Tactics and Employment (Havana, at November 1947 to 
march 1948),” J. Robert Schnetzel, uS delegation, march Washington DC, Secret, 30 march 1948.
20 Gottfried Haberler, Roberto Campos, James meade and Jan Tinbergen.
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there is some substance in the feeling of disquiet among primary producing 
countries that the present rules and conventions about commercial policies 
are relatively unfavourable to them [and] it would be unwise to count upon 
any improvement in the terms of trade of the non-industrial countries to 
raise their ability to purchase imports (GATT, 1958, pp. 11-12).
The Report was an early indicator that the GATT was about the behaviour of 
developed countries, as it concluded that existing arrangements were relatively 
unfavorable to primary producing countries (Hudec, 2010). 
INEQuALITIES IN THE mAKING
Actually a case can be made by the fact that the Latinos 
are basically right: they have a gripe, they are not get-
ting what they want, nor will they get it. We have been 
getting what we want and have been able to a large ex-
tent to separate them and to knock them off at a time. 
J. Robert Schnetzel21
Even if the developing countries and among them the “solid block” of the 
Latin American countries22, ITO Charter would be an expression of the clear-cut 
advantages of developed over developing countries. For four years, from August 
1941 to August 1945, the u.S. and the u.K. discussed postwar trade policy. After 
stalemates and delays, when the war was over, it took more than two months for 
the public release of the Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment, 
in December 1945. The political and technical knowledge acquired during these long 
and close u.S. and u.K. trade talks would not be easily challenged by the delegations 
that would participate in the preparatory meetings that would follow, in 1946 and 
1947, which “would be highly technical in character, requiring the services of per-
sons competent in the various specialized fields […] [emphasis added]”.23 
Of the 57 delegations in Havana, only 18, a third of them, had attended the 
21 NA, “Analysis of Latin America Proposals, Tactics and Employment (Havana, 21 November 1947 to 
24 march 1948)”, J. Robert Schnetzel (Technical Secretary, uS Delegation), Secret, 30 march 1948. RG 
43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions (RICCE), Box 148.
22 “In the official account on the Havana Conference, Wilgress, the head of the Canadian delegation, 
provides us with a very interesting personal evaluation of the situation […] In his view, the Latin 
American countries were able to act as a ‘solid block’ […]. They were quite unhappy with the fact that 
the u.S. government had decided to help European countries only [marshall Plan].” See Douglas, 
mavroidis, Sykes (2008, p. 121).
23 Foreign Relations of the united States, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 1280-1289. memorandum Prepared in the 
Division of Commercial Policy Preparations for Preliminary International meeting on Trade and 
Employment, Confidential, Washington, February 6, 1946, apud Douglas, mavroidis, Sykes (2008, p. 166).
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preparatory meetings, three of which were from Latin America: Brazil, Chile and 
Cuba. Therefore, the majority of the delegations that met in Havana for the Inter-
national Conference of Trade and Employment in October 1947 would barely do 
more than acknowledging the issues in discussion. Despite the visibility of some 
Latin American countries at the Conference, their ability to act occasionally as a 
group could not be compared to the u.K.’s capacity to form coalitions with their 
subjects. As seen before, once they obtained key concessions from the u.S. in their 
1945 bilateral negotiations, the u.K. successfully insisted that negotiations should 
continue in a multilateral forum, where, with its allies, it would outnumber the u.S. 
“by a factor of five to one”.
There are a number of other aspects that explain lack of bargaining power of 
several developing countries, such as the low number of representatives, the poor 
quality and efficiency of their public functions when compared to the u.S. and to 
the European countries and the misfortune of not speaking English, the working 
language of the negotiations, as their native tongue.
Brazil, Cuba and Chile were far from having the smallest delegations. Cuba 
was a clear exception among developing countries and specifically among Latin 
American countries. Being the host of the international meeting allowed Cuba to 


















































































































































Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), E/PC/T/35, 8 April 1947.24
24 The delegations numbered as follows (including general service personnel, such as secretaries): 
Argentina, 3; Australia, 63; Belgium/Luxemburg, 37/3; Brazil, 32; Canada, 27; Chile, 9; China, 20; 
Colombia, 2; Cuba, 52; Ecuador, 1; France, 106; Greece, 2; India, 36; Iran,1; Egypt, 1; Ecuador, 1; 
yugoslavia, 3; mexico, 3; Netherlands, 47; Poland, 3; Peru, 1; South African union, 24; Sweden, 2; 
Turkey, 2; united States,138; united Kingdom, 112; uruguay, 2; Venezuela, 2. Cf. united Nations, 
ECOSOC, E/PC/T/35, 8 April 1947.
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Developing countries did not have the same degree of sophistication and effi-
ciency in public functions when compared to the public administration of the u.S. 
and European countries. In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and uruguay 
were in an intermediate position concerning public administration and services. Still, 
in October 1947, in the days preceding the opening of the Conference, the chief of 
the Brazilian delegation reported to the Brazilian minister of External Relations that 
[o]ur administrative resources, means of investigation and data are too 
inadequate for this kind of negotiation. [We are not] supported, for the 
solutions to our trade politics problems that we [are going] to debate, by 
a general plan of the national economy – simply because there is no such 
plan.25
Latin American countries fought for making Spanish a second working lan-
guage at the Conference. In what the straight-talking u.S. negotiators called the 
“Spanish language battle”, these countries won a “partial victory” when it was 
agreed that some facilities would be provided at the Plenary Session, such as “whis-
pering translators” and important documents translated into Spanish. It should be 
noted that English became a working language in international meetings due to the 
rising international prominence of the u.S. after the beginning of the 20th century. 
until then, French had been the diplomatic tongue, largely spoken by the Latin 
American elite, such as diplomats. 
Relatively poor political and technical knowledge, as well as the low number 
of representatives coming from countries where English was not the official lan-
guage and where the public administration was inefficient, made developing coun-
tries weak negotiators in Havana. They did not always understand the meaning of 
substantive and procedural clauses in discussion. The result was that these substan-
tive and procedural requirements for the application of clauses mostly associated 
to the developing countries’ demands were far more restrictive than the exceptions 
related to developed countries’ interests. Exceptions related to developed countries’ 
interests, for example, did not require the prior approval of the ITO, nor could they 
be subject to the veto of any country. On the other hand, the prior approval of the 
ITO was necessary to apply the economic development exceptions demanded by 
developing countries, as observed by Hudec (1987, p. 23). 
Then,
[p]rocedure was often the key to the compromise. The developing countries 
usually obtained some recognition of the principle that “economic deve-
lopment” could be a legitimate reason for using trade-distorting measures 
prohibited by the Charter. The united States usually obtained additional 
25 AHI-Rio, Antônio de V. Ferreira-Braga to Raul Fernandes (minister of External Relations), Ofício, 
acompanha o “Relatório Preliminar sobre as Negociações do Acordo Geral de Tarifas e Comércio, 
Genebra,” October 10, 1947.
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substantive criteria limiting the scope of the exceptions and procedural 
conditions and requirements designed to limit application of the exception 
to only the very clear cases (Hudec, 1987, p. 23; emphasis added).
The Latin American opposition would only grow until it became the most 
consistent source of resistance to the terms of negotiations, something that the 
American delegates were sometimes inclined to interpret as mere stubbornness. The 
“Latin American economic theory” or the Latin American countries’ “industrializa-
tion fixation” can be considered to be the issue that synthesized the opposition that 
emerged between the American and Latin American delegations in Havana. Amer-
icans were correct when noting that that was the “motivating force behind the bulk 
of the Latin American amendments”.26
At the end of January 1948, after acknowledging the intention of the “Latino 
caucus” to present a letter to the Conference insisting on the request for the cre-
ation of a new committee, Americans would comment that “after two months of 
[American] patient exposition and accommodation, the Latinos acknowledge noth-
ing. [T]o say what we think and oppose would cause a bad atmosphere and an 
irreparable breach in the Conference”.27
However, at the same time, Americans realized that the fact that a number of 
the Latin American delegations felt that their specific problems were not seriously 
taken into consideration was a threat to the conclusion of the Conference. Hence, 
although irritated, Americans negotiators made efforts to dissipate these impres-
sions. They did not give up and they strove for a good, cooperative relationship 
with Latin American delegates, not missing out on opportunities such as luncheons 
and dinners to persist in trying to convince them about the validity and the benefits 
of a liberal trading system.
The ITO architects had in their mind the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and a con-
viction regarding its awful consequences: trade protectionism during the 1930s had 
led the world to a terrible war. Nevertheless, the developing world as a whole was 
inserted in quite a different historical context. Among them, Latin American coun-
tries had gone through, during the war, a lack of industrialized goods they could 
not import, as well as restrictions on their exports. In addition, they had to sell 
commodities to the u.S. at fixed prices. When the war ended, there were no price 
controls for importing u.S. industrial goods, while commodity exports underwent 
a steep downturn which resulted in severe BoP deficits.
In addition to opposing the American liberal economics perspective for these 
immediate and concrete needs, Latin American countries had a long historic back-
ground to underlie their points in Havana. These countries had adhered to a neo-
classical economic orientation when they became independent in the 19th century. 
However, since the beginning of the 20th century and especially from the 1930s on, 
26 NA, “Economic Views of Latin American Delegations”, Secret, Havana, no date, RG 43, RICCE, Box 39.
27 NA, “minutes of u.S. Delegation meeting,” Confidential, 31 January 1948. NA, RG 43 RICCE, Box 148.
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nationalism and conceptions about the central role of governments in promoting 
industrialization to escape underdevelopment had grown in appeal. These became 
some of the key ideas of the strong Latin American social thought that would pre-
vail for decades to come. 
Furthermore, countries that had most important trade relations with the u.S., 
as was the case of Latin American countries – Argentina being an exception – had 
seen how the u.S. had protected itself in the 1930s with the Smoot Hawley tariff. 
Nonetheless, Latin American countries also saw how the united Kingdom’s Impe-
rial Preference System suppressed competition.
During the years of the Depression, Latin American governments had seen the 
u.S. and u.K. following protectionist measures, and some of them were even trying 
to adopt a substitution of the imports model. Consequently, in Havana, there was 
a battle among countries with great asymmetries in material power. 
CONCLuSION
“We lost the fight.” Roberto Campos (2001), referring to the 
negotiations at the Havana Conference (1947-1948)
This article aimed at offering a different perspective from the mainstream 
historiographic interpretation of the Havana Conference, which negotiated and 
approved the Charter of the ITO, including the GATT. It focused on the participa-
tion of a group of non-hegemonic countries, the Latin American countries. It 
claimed that the concept of embedded liberalism, applied for qualifying and under-
standing the new international trade regime, obscures other visions than the Amer-
ican- and European-centered. Additionally, Ruggie’s concept of embedded liberal-
ism is directly linked to his definition of multilateral institutions. It was emphasized 
that the starting point for the delimitation of embedded liberalism in the case of 
trade negotiations took place in bilateral talks between u.S. and u.K. officials, not 
in a multilateral forum, resulting in the “Proposals for Expansion of World Trade 
and Employment”, which were published at the end of 1945. This would become 
the starting point for the following multilateral negotiations that were completed 
in Havana. 
Latin American countries recognized the u.S.’s legitimacy in constructing the 
post-Word War II international economic order. However, at the same time, despite 
their respective specificities and differences, there was among them a common percep-
tion that the Havana negotiations would be most of all the expression of the interests 
of developed countries. To start, Latin American countries believed that diversifying 
their economies was their more relevant challenge and objective, which was at odds 
with the liberalization brought on by the new trade regime. They believed that their 
fragile economies should face the strong economies of the developed with economic 
planning and import substitution, which had already been in place in several Latin 
American countries since the 1930s and the 1940s. The disdain showed by some u.S. 
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officials in disqualifying Latin American apprehensions as an “industrialization fixa-
tion” showed that they could not recognize the conflict of interest.
What is more, Latin American countries’ economies were extremely dependent 
on the u.S., and World War II had exacerbated this condition. Supplying strategic 
materials was these countries’ main contribution to the Allied forces. Coinciding 
with the beginning of the Havana Conference, the marshall Plan was also an-
nounced, making it clear that the expected u.S. economic plan for Latin American 
countries had become more than remote. Thus, the Havana talks began for them 
as a symbol of frustration, as it was when they ended. On the one hand, being 
commodity-exporting countries, one of most important issues for them were the 
creation of mechanisms to protect their economies from the volatility in commod-
ity markets, in which they did not succeed. On the other hand, the establishment 
of quantitative import restrictions and the creation of export subsidies to agricul-
ture were permitted, which would be detrimental to Latin American economies.
material and political constraints limited Latin American countries’ negotiat-
ing capacity, meaning they were unable to shape the new international trade rules 
to their advantage or to emerge as important players in the international trade 
regime. This study called attention to some aspects that limited the quality of these 
countries’ participation in post-Word War II trade negotiations, such as the low 
number of representatives in their delegations, the poor quality and efficiency of 
their public functions when compared to the u.S. and to the European countries, 
and their relatively weak political and technical knowledge of several substantive 
and procedural clauses in negotiation. 
Only the GATT survived, and this study may help to understand, at least in 
part, the relative lack of Latin American countries’ interest in truly participating in 
its regime during the first decades of its existence, a blow that was also felt by 
other developing countries.
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